{"id":42440,"date":"2025-10-06T16:38:44","date_gmt":"2025-10-06T20:38:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.laregion.bo\/?p=42440"},"modified":"2025-10-06T16:38:48","modified_gmt":"2025-10-06T20:38:48","slug":"bolivias-secret-lithium-agreements","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.laregion.bo\/en\/bolivias-secret-lithium-agreements\/","title":{"rendered":"Bolivia\u2019s Secret Lithium Agreements"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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Roc\u00edo Lloret C\u00e9spedes \u2013 La Regi\u00f3n \/ Dialogue Earth<\/em><\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

On the morning of January 20, 2023, an enthusiastic President Luis Arce announced the dawn of Bolivia\u2019s lithium industrialization era. Standing before an audience packed with guests at the Casa Grande del Pueblo \u2014 the seat of government \u2014 he predicted that by the first quarter of 2025 the country would be exporting lithium batteries manufactured with local raw material.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cToday is a historic day for all of us. How many years had to pass for the country to finally feel it is on the right path toward harnessing one of its most valuable natural resources, Bolivian lithium?\u201d he told attendees.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By appearing at the event, Arce sought to underscore the historic nature of the first agreement between the state-owned company Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos (YLB) and the Chinese consortium Hong Kong CBC, made up of three firms. After several failed attempts<\/a> to break into the international lithium business \u2014 considered critical for the global energy transition \u2014 the president pointed out that Bolivia would at last be able to sell its natural resources with added value, rather than as a mere commodity. \u201cThere is no time to lose,\u201d he repeated more than once.<\/p>

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The Ministry of Hydrocarbons explained<\/a> at the time that the agreement committed both parties to set up two industrial complexes based on a technology known as \u201cdirect lithium extraction\u201d (DLE). Then-minister Franklin Molina described it as \u201ca viable, real, and quickly deployable solution.\u201d According to government estimates, both facilities would produce up to 25,000 tons of lithium carbonate annually in the Uyuni salt flat (Potos\u00ed department) and the Coipasa salt flat (Oruro department).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lithium carbonate is the most common commercial form of the resource. It is a chemical compound of lithium, carbon, and oxygen, essential for producing the batteries that power electric vehicles \u2014 critical to moving away from the fossil fuels that still drive most of the world\u2019s transportation. It is also fundamental for electricity storage systems that enable large-scale use of energy from renewable sources such as solar and wind. Transportation and electricity generation are the sectors that produce the highest levels of greenhouse gas emissions globally<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this strategic market, Bolivia holds 23 million tons of lithium resources, according to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS<\/a>), one of the world\u2019s largest volumes. However, the country has yet to certify its reserves<\/a>, the portion of resources that can be economically exploited.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Five months after Arce\u2019s announcement, YLB had to clarify that what was presented in January 2023 was a study agreement<\/a>, not a contract to build industrial plants. Opposition lawmaker Mar\u00eda Jos\u00e9 Salazar, along with other congress members and civil society actors, demanded explanations from the government for not disclosing the document or submitting it to the Legislative Assembly. Article 158, section 12<\/a> of the Constitution stipulates that the legislature must \u201capprove contracts of public interest related to natural resources and strategic areas, signed by the Executive Branch.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In June 2023 \u2014 a year and a half after President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine<\/a> \u2014 the Bolivian government signed a new agreement, this time for \u201cthe creation of a production plant with a capacity of 25,000 tons of lithium carbonate per year, based on the Pastos Grandes salt flat.\u201d The deal was made with Uranium One Group, a subsidiary of the Russian state-owned giant Rosatom. Exactly one year later, Arce himself met<\/a> in Russia with Rosatom<\/a> president Alexey Likhachev to discuss lithium, despite the latter having been sanctioned by the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia precisely for the Russian invasion of Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Between 2023 and 2024, Bolivia signed 14 documents labeled \u201cagreements,\u201d according to an infographic<\/a> published by the state-owned YLB last July and still available on its website. This designation allowed the government to make deals without sending them to the Legislative Assembly. \u201cWe are talking about a first stage of agreements that fall within the powers of Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos. Once these agreements conclude, and in the case of success, the corresponding contracts will indeed be signed, which \u2014 according to the law \u2014 must be published and approved by the Assembly,\u201d Karla Calder\u00f3n, then-president of the state-owned company, told<\/a> the local outlet Erbol in 2024.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From public announcements, it is known that the companies involved in these agreements come from six countries \u2014 China, Russia, Australia-Germany, France, and Argentina \u2014 for the purposes of study and development, though their content and execution remain undisclosed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This opacity has raised concerns across wide sectors of Bolivian society. \u201cI call them instruments, because their scope and the responsibilities of each party are unknown,\u201d warns sociologist Marco Gandarillas, a researcher at the environmental organization Latinomerica Sustentable<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Three of the agreements\u2014one with Uranium One Group and two on behalf of Hong Kong CBC Investment Limited\u2014 later gave way to two contracts, according to the general process outlined by the former president of YLB.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

La Regi\u00f3n<\/em> and Dialogue Earth<\/em>, partners in the Lithium in Conflict<\/em> investigation coordinated by the Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism, obtained both contracts along with their annexes and full reports. An analysis of these documents, conducted together with Bolivian experts in natural resource governance and Indigenous rights, raises pressing questions about the economic benefits of lithium exploitation for Bolivia under this scheme, the environmental impacts it will bring, and what happens when there are overlaps with Indigenous communities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These questions have gained traction in Bolivia\u2019s presidential campaign, fueled by the country\u2019s severe economic and energy crisis<\/a>. The two candidates headed for the runoff this Sunday, October 19 \u2014 Senator Rodrigo Paz and former president Jorge \u201cTuto\u201d Quiroga \u2014 both pledged<\/a> to reject the two contracts, while agreeing that lithium is a resource the country must exploit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Luis<\/a>
Luis Arce during the presentation of the first agreement with CBC in 2023. Photo: ABI<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

A Handful of Opaque Agreements<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

How did Bolivia come to accumulate agreements whose contents remain secret, while being showcased as the great promise to turn the country into a key player in the global energy transition?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2021, just months after taking office, Luis Arce shifted Bolivia\u2019s lithium policy. Gone was the traditional method of solar evaporation in open-air pools promoted by his predecessor, Evo Morales, into which the state had poured more than $585 million USD<\/a>. In its place came the push for direct lithium extraction (DLE), promoted by his government as a modern technology<\/a> \u201cthat allows for faster and more sustainable production of lithium carbonate,\u201d according to official sources.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To that end, YLB launched the first call<\/a> for tenders in April 2021, inviting companies with DLE technology to conduct pilot tests using brines from the Uyuni, Coipasa, and Pastos Grandes salt flats, according to the Ministry of Hydrocarbons<\/a>. The second call<\/a> was issued in January 2024, \u201cfor the use of evaporitic resources under real conditions in the Uyuni, Coipasa, Pastos Grandes, Capina, Ca\u00f1apa, Chiguana, and Empexa salt flats,\u201d then-minister Franklin Molina announced<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n